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notes on “tHe Virtue
of sCienCe anD tHe
sCienCe of Virtue”
Daniel P. Maher
BENE VIXIT,  BENE QUI L ATUIT.  Descartes chose this line from ovid’s Tristia (III.4.25) as a personal motto, which I translate as “he 
lived well who hid well.”1 It seems, then, that Descartes’ art of living involves 
hiding and, according to the portrait of Descartes that Th omas hibbs pres-
ents in this volume, Descartes’ art of writing hides his preoccupation with 
the art of living. If we overlook the primacy of the question of the good life 
for Descartes, we risk obscuring “the unity in his various projects” (*25).2 By 
discovering or restoring the centrality of this question, hibbs fi nds the key 
to unraveling how Descartes combines his well-known antipathy toward the 
philosophical and theological tradition with his unduly neglected Socratism, 
which ties him irrevocably to that tradition. And because that tradition in-
cludes Christianity, Descartes’ focus on the good life necessarily implicates 
him in theological matters, at which point his view of the good life slips out 
of focus or, better, at which point Descartes blurs our access to that view in its 
relation to Christian faith. Th us, we come to see the reason that the precise 
character of Descartes’ understanding of the good life could be both central 
to his thought and yet neglected in contemporary scholarship.
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notes on “the Virtue of science and the science of Virtue”     47 
Descartes exercised greater diligence in obscuring any tension or con-
flict with the Catholic Church than he did in concealing his attack on Ar-
istotle, which he seemed eager to veil only insofar as he suspected it might 
offend those churchmen whose support he wanted.3 hibbs explores these 
themes with an impressive command of Descartes’ published and unpub-
lished writings, and although his portrait is not finished in every respect 
(e.g., he refrains from weighing in on the relation between the provisional 
and the final morality), he invites us to think anew about Descartes in 
relation to the fundamental issues of classical philosophy. I find it a most 
agreeable task to comment on his chapter—a task I see as requiring me 
neither to dissect hibbs’ portrait nor to provide an alternative. Instead, 
with these remarks I intend to probe the three focal points of hibbs’ 
chapter and to encourage further consideration along the same path he 
has cleared.
hibbs divides his essay into three parts: “Recovering and overcoming 
Socrates,” “Descartes’ New Science of Virtue,” and “Theology, the Sover-
eign Good, and Ironic Philosophy.” The three parts converge, and he inte-
grates the central theme of each in a single sentence near the end: “In this 
way, Descartes’ overcoming of Socrates, his new science of virtue, is simul-
taneously a strategy for bypassing the debate between Athens and Jerusa-
lem” (*41). This formulation encapsulates the parts of the essay as neatly 
as one could hope. With the convergence of these three themes clearly in 
mind, let us proceed to a consideration of the main theme of each part of 
the essay.
The naTure of carTeSian irony
It seems most appropriate to begin at the end and focus especially on 
the theme of irony. According to the argument, Descartes’ “focus on the 
question of the best way of life” puts him irreconcilably at odds with the 
tradition of Christian faith (*39). Descartes habitually confines theology 
to dealing with mysteries that exceed our understanding and with the 
practical question of how to get to heaven. Thus neutered, theologians 
should have nothing to say about the proper concerns of the various arts 
and sciences, including philosophy, and are at best useful to Descartes 
for the approbation he hopes to win from them, inasmuch as ecclesias-
tical authority influences those not governed by reason. hibbs leads us 
to see, nevertheless, that co-existence without conflict between Christian 
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48     DanieL P. MaHer
theology and Cartesian philosophy proves impossible because Descartes 
conceives the best way of life as to be achieved not through grace but by 
Descartes’ own efforts. Philosophy as a way of life has become not just a 
pursuit but a possession, especially in the new science of nature (*40). In 
this Descartes distinguishes himself from Montaigne, whose more skepti-
cal complacency does not present the same challenge. According to hibbs, 
the Meditations on First Philosophy not only contains the principles of the 
new science of nature4 but also advances “the articulation and realization 
of the best way of life” (*40). Descartes’ confidence in his grasp of the hu-
man good enables him to avoid open engagement with theology. There 
is no gap in his philosophy that theology might fill, he has no taste for 
open confrontation, and therefore he limits himself to treating theology 
only ironically (*40–41).
The most difficult elements here concern the relation between the new 
science of nature and Descartes’ science of virtue (a topic to which I re-
turn below). The first theme that demands attention is Descartes’ irony, 
by which he keeps the Sorbonne theologians and others at bay. Whereas 
Socrates seems always to have been known for his irony, Descartes has 
avoided this reputation—or at least today Descartes is not so widely asso-
ciated with irony. And this suggests his irony deserves closer attention. As 
hibbs notes, Descartes praises Socrates for candor in confessing his igno-
rance and criticizes Aristotle for disingenuous pretensions to knowledge. 
In the third part of the Discourse on Method, likening himself inexplicitly 
but unmistakably to Socrates, Descartes describes the desire to combat his 
own reputation for wisdom, which he supposes may have arisen due to his 
“confessing more frankly” than is customary what he does not know and 
to his not “boasting of any doctrine.”5 In the same breath, he eschews irony 
and assures us that, “being proud” (ayant le coeur assez bon), he wishes 
not to be taken for something other than he is. on the same note, in the 
first part of the Discourse, he mentioned that he hoped everyone would be 
grateful for his frankness.6 Descartes’ irony occurs side by side with a cel-
ebration of sincerity that enables him to insinuate the lack of any need for 
irony, because everyone can—by means of the method—know the truth, 
or so it appears.7
This movement in Descartes’ thought toward general enlightenment 
stands in some tension with the irony he directs at least toward the theo-
logically minded. In what seems to be another striking allusion to Socrates 
(or Plato) in the sixth part of the Discourse, Descartes expresses his unwill-
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notes on “the Virtue of science and the science of Virtue”     49 
ingness to be completely forthcoming with the principles of the science 
of nature he has discovered. he complains about certain contemporaries 
who take Aristotle as their authority and attempt to use him to solve dif-
ficulties he never addressed. They are like ivy that not only can ascend 
no higher than the trees on which it depends but also tends not to re-
main at that height but often turns and descends. Perhaps Descartes has in 
mind theologians for whom Aristotle serves as the principal philosophical 
authority. Whoever they may be, Descartes says one can convince these 
people of nothing because “the obscurity of the distinctions and principles 
they use enables them to speak of all things as boldly as if they knew them, 
and to defend whatever they say.”8 They are like blind men, and to converse 
with them one would need to abandon the superiority afforded by sight 
and descend “to the bottom of some extremely dark cave” (dans le fond 
de quelque cave fort obscure).9 Descartes’ own principles are so clear and 
so evident that, were he to publish them, it would be like opening win-
dows and letting daylight into the cellar. Descartes’ enlightenment would 
be sunlight in the cave.
Three elements especially deserve attention here. first, the cave or cellar 
is not conceived as the natural or inescapable home of all educated people. 
It is the place to which a clear-sighted person must descend in order to 
compensate for the disadvantages afflicting these Aristotelians with “only 
mediocre minds.”10 Second, even when the daylight enters, these interloc-
utors will still see nothing, because their blindness does not result merely 
from the darkness of their location. Some people are blinded from within, 
and Descartes seems uninterested in reaching at least some of them. As he 
indicates in Meditations, Descartes demands a reader who has abandoned 
attachment to the senses and prior opinions; he does employ a kind of pro-
treptic argument to lead his readers to methodical doubt, but even then he 
does not engage ordinary opinions so much as he undermines or inciner-
ates them.11 Third, Cartesian principles do at least provide the light of day 
for any mind free of all prejudices, which thus promises enlightenment to 
all who are willing to conduct their reason rightly. The cave may not be 
Plato’s cave, but perhaps there is a cellar at the foundation of the edifice of 
the sciences as Descartes reconstructs them. If so, Descartes seems willing 
to let in the daylight rather than be in the position of needing to compel 
someone who has seen the sun to return to a darkened cellar. Metaphors 
aside, Descartes appears to prefer enlightenment to Platonic acquiescence 
concerning the limited openness of political life to knowledge.
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50     DanieL P. MaHer
to bring these remarks on irony to a point, I note that the light shed by 
Descartes’ principles seems to be both for and not for everyone’s benefit. After 
all, he did not publish Le Monde (the treatise containing these principles), 
although he advertises its existence in the sixth part of the Discourse as he 
explains his decision to reverse his prior resolution to publish it (a practical 
decision, incidentally, in flagrant violation of the second maxim of moral-
ity). Ultimately, he published the Discourse instead, which he presents as a 
story or a fable, the whole of which therefore participates in “the necessary 
indirection of storytelling.”12 In the Discourse, Descartes speaks ironically 
to the learned and at least affects frankness with his popular audience. By 
simulating (in some passages) the equality of all minds and dissimulating 
his own superiority, Descartes makes the extent of his irony much more 
difficult to discover; he seems to invite the reader to see through his irony 
much less than does Plato or Socrates. It seems less protreptic, and indeed 
in hibbs’ reading Descartes’ refusal to take received opinion seriously im-
plies a rejection of the genre of protreptic writing (*32). even so, hibbs 
emphasizes in the first part of his essay that Descartes is concerned to 
write in a manner conducive to provoking rather than enervating thought 
(*29). If Descartes does intend to do this, we could benefit from a more 
precise taxonomy of Cartesian readers. how many kinds of readers does 
Descartes envision, and what are his aims with each?
A few further observations may help clarify this question. It seems to 
me that Descartes has neither a strategy for nor any interest in enlivening 
the minds of the blind Aristotelians shuffling around in his cellar. This 
seems to be the force of hibbs’ appropriate emphasis on the use of irony to 
keep theology away from direct contact with philosophy, but the complex-
ity and the range of Cartesian irony requires further consideration. At the 
least we should note that his irony pleases much more than does the So-
cratic variety. As Richard Kennington has observed, everybody enjoys the 
first sentence of the Discourse, whether he sees the irony or he does not.13 
If Locke is correct, pain moves us to change our condition but pleasure 
inclines us to stay as we are. Does Descartes exercise irony principally for 
our benefit or his own? finally, in an intriguing passage in the first part of 
his paper, hibbs connects irony to temporality and to method and claims 
that Descartes directs irony “only toward those unaware of the method or 
toward the former self of the narrator” (*30). further elaboration of this 
claim would lead to interesting and helpful reflection on the particularity 
of Descartes’ narrative and the universality of his intention (cf. *30).
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notes on “the Virtue of science and the science of Virtue”     51 
The Science of naTure aS exTenSion
A second theme, which surfaces most clearly at the juncture of the first 
and second parts of hibbs’ essay, is the certainty of the new science of na-
ture. hibbs presents Descartes as dissatisfied with the zetetic conception of 
philosophy that appears to be embraced by Socrates or by Montaigne. “The 
key insight of Socrates’ entire life, the awareness that made him wiser than 
others, provides for Descartes merely an occasion to underscore the de-
fects of his own education” (*31). hibbs shows beautifully how Descartes 
likens his own opponents to the sophists with whom Socrates contended 
(*31). My concern lies with the character of his surpassing Socrates. hibbs 
quotes David Lachterman, who says that Cartesian method constrains its 
objects such that “their very intelligibility becomes identical with their 
susceptibility to methodical treatment.”14 one could find a great deal of 
support for the claim that Descartes thinks the essence of material beings 
is identical with their mathematically knowable features.
But perhaps this is part of his irony. Perhaps Descartes constrained the 
human erôs for knowledge of the whole to something more pedestrian and 
achievable (a suggestion that seems to be entertained but underdeveloped 
near the end of the essay). A steady will in the face of “the distracting ef-
fect of wonder”15 may enable us to concentrate our energies on what we 
can know. We can satisfy the mind’s desire to know at the same time that 
we satisfy the needs of the body, principally health, provided that we rigor-
ously follow the method and do not get lost in search of first causes, those 
noble but to us barely knowable principles (*41). one can see the appear-
ance of a version of this line of thinking in Locke’s Essay concerning Hu-
man Understanding. Much as Locke does not think that natural science is 
genuinely demonstrable (and Locke knew of “the incomparable Mr. New-
ton”),16 so Descartes might conceive his physics as a science that does not 
apprehend the real essence of material things. It might be instead a science 
constricted to that part of nature that is conformable to the human mind 
and subject to mastery, although that part (quantity) is understood not to 
be ultimate in things.
francis Bacon seems to be the inspiration for this line of thinking. he 
criticized the ancients for flying too swiftly from consideration of a few 
particulars to first principles. he substituted a slow and steady ascent in 
the direction of the summa lex in all of nature, even if one had to admit 
that the first and most universal principle(s) remained beyond our grasp. 
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52     DanieL P. MaHer
for his part, Descartes speaks similarly in the Rules for the Direction of the 
Mind. Rule eight announces the need to limit investigation to those things 
that can be intuited by our intellect. Knowledge of the limits of achievable 
inquiry “is just as much knowledge as that which reveals the nature of the 
thing,” and it so “abundantly” satisfies curiosity that it would be irratio-
nal to inquire further.17 The proto-critique of pure reason that Descartes 
sketches in this rule is accompanied by this assertion: “We should then 
turn to the things themselves; and we should deal with these only in so 
far as they are within the reach of the intellect.”18 In this manner Descartes 
sketches the combination of a limited science of nature with the abundant 
satisfaction of the human desire to know.
It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from Descartes’ early, in-
complete, and unpublished Rules,19 but we are compelled to wonder about 
the extent to which Descartes regarded his science of nature as the fulfill-
ment of the classical erôs to know the first principles of nature. In one 
reading, Descartes gives himself a knowable object that enables him to 
pass beyond the skepticism of Socrates and Montaigne, and he wittingly 
ignores and invites the rest of us to ignore any desire to know the whole. 
We find satisfaction in achieving a human science in place of the frustra-
tions accompanying the apparently vain pursuit of the divine science Aris-
totle described—wisdom through knowledge of the first and most univer-
sal causes. In this interpretation, the Cartesian life of the mind consists in 
the carrying out of the project described in the Discourse, and in view of 
the image of philosophy as a tree, Descartes himself would miss out on the 
principal benefit of philosophy.20
In another reading, this is all part of Descartes’ irony. he distracts most 
of those who are attracted to knowing with this intoxicating tale of the 
ability to comprehend all of nature, while he hides from them the fact 
that he offers comprehension only of an abstraction—quantity. This en-
ables him to guarantee some success in the pursuit—namely, success for 
those whose desire to know is satisfied by the knowledge of laws of na-
ture, which serve as rules of operation for the expansion of power, without 
insight into the nature of things. to the extent that the new science of 
nature becomes the source of untold humanitarian benefits, Descartes is 
in a position to give philosophy the reputation of being beneficial to ordi-
nary people and thereby to reorder the relation between philosophy and 
non-philosophers (society or the political community).21 In this reading, 
we are forced to take very seriously the distinction in the sixth part of the 
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notes on “the Virtue of science and the science of Virtue”     53 
Discourse that Descartes makes between himself and any followers who 
adopt and execute his method. Descartes, the inventor of the method that 
others merely follow, withdraws behind yet another mask to live a life he 
declines to reveal. In either of these readings, we are more likely to over-
look philosophy entirely.22 The philosophical life, as classically conceived, 
is discredited by comparison to the new human possibility: the scientific 
life, which emerges as the successful-because-humanitarian offspring of 
philosophy. Philosophy as search for wisdom recedes from view. In Des-
cartes’ understanding of his own life, does scientific wisdom in this sense 
displace philosophical pursuit of wisdom in the classical sense?
The characTer of deScarTeS’ philoSophical life
The new science of nature is intimately connected to the new science of 
virtue, as hibbs has argued persuasively, and for this reason my remarks in 
the last section have already begun to bleed over into this one. The precise 
character of the connection between natural science and virtue remains 
somewhat elusive. Descartes speaks again and again in the Discourse of the 
contentment, tranquility, and happiness that characterizes his life, which 
either is the life of an inquirer after the truth (that is, a philosopher in the 
traditional sense, as the fourth maxim of the provisional morality tends 
to suggest)23 or is, as hibbs has presented it, the life of a man who pos-
sesses wisdom (*40). If it is the latter, could a philosopher be satisfied or 
content with a life contemplating the simple necessities that matter must 
obey—matter understood as extension and as excluding goods or ends, 
which is how Descartes characterizes the principles of his physics?24 As 
much as Descartes promises that his new science of nature will lead (in the 
future) to technical devices for the mastery of nature, he also stresses his 
own current satisfaction even in the absence of those practical benefits. he 
does not mourn his inability to enter the technological Promised Land. Is 
Descartes genuinely contemplative of nature as constrained by method? Is 
he genuinely tranquil or just tranquilized?
Alternatively, is the object of his contemplation something more tradi-
tional and more Socratic than might first meet the eye? I have in mind here 
the Baconian precedent. Bacon admits that the new method or the New 
Organon does not generate itself and does not justify its own goodness. 
his new method is the only adequate method for dealing with nature, but 
“the logic now in use” is very properly applied to civil matters.25 That is, 
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54     DanieL P. MaHer
Bacon’s argument with his predecessors as to the goodness of the new ap-
proach to nature is an argument that cannot be had scientifically but must 
be had by appeal to traditional political and moral categories. Descartes’ 
Discourse has essentially the same nature: a civil or popular argument in 
defense of the goodness of a new method.
Perhaps, then, Descartes turns out to be rather like his philosophical 
predecessors after all. The argument of the Discourse (most emphatically 
its sixth part) does not take its shape from the new method or from the 
provisional morality (except possibly from the fourth maxim); it is instead 
a prudential, dialogical, even classical bit of reasoning. In order to engage 
in it, Descartes must take seriously, at least provisionally, the opinions of 
the non-Cartesians among whom he lives. The sixth part of the Discourse 
addresses the reasons that have made him write,26 and so this text concerns 
his end as a philosophical author. to put all of this in the form of a ques-
tion, are the good life and the new science of virtue devoted to contempla-
tion, technical benefits, hedonism in the Lockean sense, or what? What is 
the end animating Descartes?27
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and Metaphysics, ed. Stuart f. Spicker (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1978), 210.
20. Preface to the french edition of Principles of Philosophy (CSM 1:186; Oeuvres de
Descartes Ix.14.23–15.5).
21. See Kennington, “Descartes and Mastery of Nature,” 201–23; Richard Kenning-
ton, “René Descartes,” in On Modern Origins, ed. Pamela Kraus and frank hunt (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington Books, 2004), 187–204.
22. See Velkley, “Masks of Mastery,” 9.
23. Descartes speaks of “three or four” maxims. The first three maxims guide action 
rather directly, but the fourth stands on a different plane insofar as it involves the choice of 
a life devoted to the pursuit of truth. That life of inquiry is presented as if it were identical to 
the resolute attachment to the method (mentioned several times in the first two parts of the 
Discourse). It is this attachment that leads him to embrace the first three maxims. As Ken-
nington was known to say, Descartes’ provisional morality incorporates a non-provisional 
conception of the good. for another estimation of the non-provisional dimensions of the 
morality, see Robert Spaemann, “La morale provisoire de Descartes,” Archives de Philoso-
phie 35 (1972): 353–67.
24. See Discourse, part 5, and the sixth meditation.
25. See the end of the long first paragraph in The Great Instauration. In various writ-
ings, including the Distributio Operis (or “Plan of the Work,” published with The New Or-
ganon), Bacon asserts the necessity for an argument on the nature of the arts and sciences 
in order to win faith in his new method. The Advancement of Learning, in its two versions, 
is as close as Bacon came to providing the missing argument.
26. Discourse, 15; Oeuvres de Descartes VI.1.16.
27. See Letter to Princess elizabeth, 18 August 1645 (CSM-K, 261; Oeuvres de Des-
cartes IV.275.1–13). In that letter Descartes says our final end may be either the supreme 
good at which we aim or the contentment that results from possessing it.
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